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RETHINKING THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY CRISIS: THE
NEED FOR A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
BRUCE J. WINICK1
The intense debate over national health policy seems to reflect a new
consensus about the need to overhaul our health care delivery system. As the
nation moves toward health care reform, we must ensure that we create a
system that is fair, that provides incentives both to reduce costs and encourage
wellness, and that is sensitive to the delivery system's inevitable impact on
patient health.
Health care costs are estimated at $940 billion a year. These costs have
escalated so dramatically-approximately ten percent a year-that even many
in the middle class must go without adequate health care or obtain it only at
great personal sacrifice. This is especially true for increasing numbers of people
who cannot afford health insurance. One suggested solution is to require
employers in businesses over a specified size to provide a certain level of health
insurance for full-time employees. But the cost of insurancehas risen so sharply
that many employers will respond by hiring certain employees only on a
part-time basis in order to avoid this requirement. The demand for a system of
national health coverage has thus increased.
In designing a sensible system of national health insurance we need to avoid
a repetition of the built-in inflationary pressures that followed the adoption of
Medicaid and Medicare. Medicaid and Medicare eligibility encouraged many
to increase their use of health care services, in part because they no longer
needed to bear the costs (or full costs) of services. This increased demand,
exceeding the supply of health care services, predictably produced price hikes.
Other factors undoubtedly have contributed to the escalation of health care
costs, including the tendency of some doctors to order unnecessary diagnostic
tests, over-reliance on high technology, and the general unresponsiveness of
medical costs to competitive pressures. But the increased demand produced by
Medicaid and Medicare probably played a role. This is simple economics.
Freed of the disincentive of having to pay for, minimize, or avoid
unnecessary services, many individuals overused health care, leading to
problems of waste and inefficiency. For many customers, going to an
"all-you-can-eat" restaurant where a fixed price buys an unlimited quantity of
food seems to produce overeating. Similarly, a health care reimbursement
scheme that reduces the disincentive to be parsimonious in the utilization of
services will predictably produce inappropriate and inefficient use of
resources. This is simple psychology.
1Copyright 1993 by Bruce J. Winick, Professor of Law, University of Miami School
of Law.
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Moreover, when demand for services is unchecked by considerations of cost,
their price remains unchecked by the pressures of competition. In a health care
system in which someone else pays the bills-government or an insurance
company--and in which providers can increase their profits by selling more,
or more expensive, services, there is bound to be a constant escalation in
services. Imagine if, in the all-you-can-eat restaurant, the restaurant gets paid
by someone other than the customer based on the quantity of food consumed.
Similar problems have haunted health maintenance organizations (HMOs).
HMOs are designed to encourage more preventative approaches by placing
incentives on providers to keep consumers enrolled in their programs healthy
in order to avoid the provision of more expensive treatment services. This is a
good idea, placing the emphasis on wellness services, giving the provider an
incentive to keep the patient healthy, and avoiding the incentive to provide
unnecessary services in order to increase profits. However, these plans
probably also have produced excess and inefficient service utilization by
consumers, driving up costs to providers and discouraging many from offering
services on an HMO basis. Providing valued services without any marginal
cost to the consumer predictably will have the effect of reinforcing the use of
such services, not necessarily their appropriate use.
A number of methods of cost containment have been discussed, including
utilization review, upper limits on specified services, and price controls. In
addition to these, we need to recapture, at least to some extent, the incentive
for people to use health care services appropriately and efficiently. When
people must pay for services out of their own pockets, they have a greater
incentive to use only those services that they really need. Requiring people to
pay out of their own pockets, however, is not truly possible for the increasing
numbers in our society who lack pockets that are deep enough.
Instead of structuring national health insurance on a Medicaid-type
reimbursement basis, we might develop an approach in which a specified level
of health care dollars is guaranteed to any individual (or any individual within
certain income categories). Any expenditures in excess of this amount would
be subject to a co-insurance-type sharing in which the individual would pay a
specified percentage of the extra costs, say twenty percent. To discourage
consumers from spending the specified amount even if they do not need to do
so, we might similarly allow them to receive a percentage of the unspent
portion, for example, twenty percent or fifty percent. The proposal would not
use a deductible amount, as some insurance schemes do, under which the
individual must pay the first several hundred dollars before reimbursement
could start. In the health care context, such a deductible may have the
unintended effect of discouraging some people from obtaining important
diagnostic and preventative services in order to avoid paying the deductible.
Such preventative services, designed to keep people healthy and avoid more
expensive treatment, should be encouraged rather than discouraged. The
system should be structured so as to remove impediments to preventative
approaches, some of which (for example, immunizations and nutritional
counseling) could be available at reduced costs in order to encourage their
utilization. In addition, services classified as preventative could be exempted
from "co-insurance" or cost-sharing, or could be made the subject of
cost-sharing at a reduced rate to the consumer. In these ways the health care
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system can be reconceptualized as a wellness system rather than merely as one
designed to respond to and treat illness. By encouraging wellness services and
providing the individual with a cash incentive to stay healthy, the system
would be employing a form of "wagering" or behavioral contracting with
individuals to look after their own health.2
To further encourage proper utilization of services, the cost of obtaining a
second opinion prior to certain types of surgery or other expensive or
hazardous interventions could be exempted from co-insurance or otherwise
subsidized. Getting a second opinion would allow patients to avoid
unnecessary services, and may produce added confidence in the need for
appropriate services, a feeling that may in itself increase their therapeutic value.
The specified annual amount of health care payment guaranteed each
individual could be set legislatively, or through use of a flexible administrative
process that each year could establish the amount in light of changing
circumstances, much the way the New York City Rent Stabilization Board each
year specifies permissible limits for increased rent for apartment lease
renewals. Such an annual adjustment would also function as a mechanism of
health care cost containment, limiting the inflationary spirals that we have had
in recent years. The specified annual amount could either be identical for all
individuals, or vary with income level in accordance with a principle similar
to the one used in the progressive income tax. Above certain income levels,
perhaps determined as a matter of adjusted gross income for federal income
tax purposes, an individual's or family's health benefits might decrease and be
eliminated altogether when income exceeds higher levels.
There are several categories of patients for which the limits on
reimbursement and the incentive scheme suggested here could not work or
would work imperfectly. Those born with certain conditions, such as Down's
syndrome or cerebral palsy, will require more medical care at considerably
higher expense, and hence should not be subject to the same reimbursement
limits applicable to most people. Similarly, those experiencing catastrophic
illnesses or accidents--cancer, AIDS, or an auto accident leaving them
paralyzed, for example-cannot control their health needs and will require
additional help as a matter of equity. Moreover, veterans who have suffered
service-related disabilities, for which under our long-standing tradition they
receive free care from Veteran's Administration facilities, have a legitimate
entitlement claim to the continuation of such care that should not be disturbed
by the restructuring of our health care system applicable to people generally.
The elderly similarly should be given special consideration. Advancing age
itself produces increased health needs. At least those whose income has fallen
below certain limits as a result of retirement or partial retirement should be
eligible for a higher degree of eligibility for reimbursement. In addition, some
adjustments in eligibility may need to be made for the poor, or at least for those
2 See Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as
a Mechanisn for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1991).
1992-931
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
eligible for welfare, who cannot be expected to share in the costs of their
medical care.
Caring for the health needs of those with congenital abnormalities or other
severe disabilities, those suffering catastrophic illnesses or injuries, veterans
who have become injured in the defense of their country, and the poor and the
elderly will be expensive. But an emerging social consensus regards the
provision of basic health care for those in our community who cannot afford it
for themselves to be a matter of equity. For others, however, a system
employing reimbursement limits, cost-sharing, and incentives toward wellness
and appropriate and efficient service utilization seems appropriate.
Paying for the high cost of a new national health care delivery system will
require creative approaches. The proposal thata portion of the amounts needed
should be raised through a special tax on tobacco and alcohol is a good one.
Use of these substances undeniably causes serious health risks and necessitates
costly treatment services. Taxing their sale in a way that discourages their use
can be defended as a public health measure in addition to providing a source
of revenue for paying for the health needs of all. Similarly, a special tax can be
considered for certain "junk foods"-those with little nutritional value that
pose risks to health. These should not be considered "sin taxes," as some have
termed them, but rather as methods of discouraging unhealthy practices and
requiring those who persist in being unwise to internalize the costs of their bad
habits.
If the new health care system works as intended, it may help to pay for itself
through increased productivity. Preventative approaches will lessen employee
absenteeism and lengthen the productive lives of workers. Although the added
tax revenues thus produced may be difficult to estimate, they could go a long
way toward paying for the added cost of ensuring universal health coverage.
The reimbursement scheme could be structured to use a "voucher" system
in order to harness the psychological power of choice. Individuals like to make
decisions for themselves. Indeed, allowing an individual to choose his or her
own health provider or type of service would produce not only greater patient
satisfaction, but predictably also would increase the efficacy of treatment.3
Expectancy theory and other principles of social and cognitive psychology
support the prediction that people will respond better in a variety of
therapeutic situations, with a higher degree of compliance with treatment
recommendations, when they have a measure of choice in regard to both the
treatment itself and the selection of the provider of services. For these reasons,
the restructured health care system should reject the approaches of some health
insurance schemes and managed care proposals that restrict patients to a list
of providers or that assign them to particular providers. These approaches
ignore the psychological power of choice and may actually reduce the effective
3 See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction between
Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming, 1993).
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provision of services as well as patient satisfaction, compliance, and positive
response.
The private market would presumably adjust for varying demands for
different kinds of providers and services by providing a wide array of such
services that consumers could purchase with their "vouchers." In economic
terms, the market would respond to consumer demand by providing differing
services to meet different individual demands, and competition for health
vouchers would keep prices down and produce an efficient and rational
allocation of resources.
There are problems, however, with "voucher" systems. Food stamps are
illustrative. A secondary market is often created in the vouchers, which may
defeat the purpose of the program. For example, in some cities there exists a
black market for food stamps in which some individuals barter their stamps
for money or other commodities (including illicit drugs or alcohol). In order to
avoid such a secondary market, and the high administrative costs of having a
bureaucracy involved in the issuance and redemption of vouchers, the
program could use some credit card-type arrangement in which individuals
would be issued a credit card with which to charge their health services, or
perhaps those with existing credit cards could use them. This would decrease
the potential for fraud, and because the "voucher" would not be negotiable
bearer paper, would make it difficult for the development of a secondary
market in vouchers. The use of already existing credit cards, or the provision
of incentives for credit card companies to develop and administer the use of a
card for this purpose, could minimize the potential bureaucratic inefficiencies
of having government itself play the major operational role.
Employers should be encouraged to provide a variety of health insurance
and health care packages for their employees which employees can elect as
alternatives to the credit card voucher system guaranteeing the specified limits
of services described above. Perhaps tax credits could be used to provide an
incentive for employers, the way tax incentives have been used to encourage
the construction of low-income housing. Providing incentives to employers to
participate in solving the health care delivery problem may be preferable to
requiring them to do so in ways that might produce unanticipated negative
effects, such as reduction of full-time positions.
In redesigning the health care delivery system, we need to be sensitive to the
inevitable impact of the system we develop on patient health.4 We should
therefore build in appropriate incentives for the proper utilization of
preventative approaches, for patients to assume responsibility for their own
health, and for efficient and effective use of services generally. We also need to
4 See DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(1991); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, The Potential of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A
New Approach to Law and Psychology, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF THE
DISCIPLINE 211 (James R. P. Ogloff ed., 1992); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and
Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991).
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maximize the opportunities for patient choice and control in matters of health
care in order to realize the psychological benefits this can produce, increasing
the efficacy of treatment, patients' sense of self-efficacy, and consumer
satisfaction. The legal and regulatory structures we adopt can produce positive
or negative consequences for individual and public health. In addition to
considerations of equity and economy, we should take these therapeutic
implications into account in redesigning our health care delivery system.
